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Terrorism
Review

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6 January 1983

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**Terrorism
Review**

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6 January 1983

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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone

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**Enhanced West German
Counterterrorist Effort**

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West German authorities are strengthening security measures to combat an increased terrorist threat against US nationals, particularly in the wake of car bombing incidents in mid-December. [REDACTED]

Federal and state level officials briefed US Embassy officers on 17 December on new steps to enhance security at US housing areas in and around Frankfurt. Citing a sharp increase in terrorist attacks against US interests since early 1982 and the recent employment of car bombs with pressure-type detonators in the Frankfurt area [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the West Germans stressed their concern that US dependents were increasingly at risk and that any injury to US civilians could have serious consequences for bilateral relations. [REDACTED]

According to the Germans, their security services are determined to protect US nationals against terrorist actions. The West Germans have assigned an additional 200 to 300 policemen and 150 security guards to protect the more than 40 US housing complexes in the Frankfurt area. Security will be particularly heavy at night and on weekends—the times when most terrorist attacks this year have been staged. The West Germans said that a public relations campaign would be conducted and that increased rewards for information would be offered. They also stated that they were formulating a new strategy to combat terrorist bombings, including unspecified “unconventional methods,” and that they would soon make suggestions for further strengthening security. [REDACTED]

The West German officials also noted that they had information suggesting that terrorists had embarked on a broad, NATO-wide campaign and that potential targets were under careful observation. We are unable to corroborate this information. [REDACTED]

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The West Germans indicated uncertainty whether the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) were responsible for recent anti-US terrorism, as the RZ has generally avoided inflicting personal injuries. No group has claimed credit for recent attacks, however. [REDACTED]

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**Outside Research:
Correlations Between Voting
and Terrorist
Incidents in Italy**

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An Italian forensic psychiatrist who is a recognized expert in terrorism is now engaged in a multifactorial quantitative study relating the incidence of terrorism to various social and economic indicators. A preliminary finding, not yet reported in the literature, that is particularly intriguing is the inverse relationship between voting for leftwing candidates and terrorist incidents. While a strong negative correlation exists between the percentage of votes cast for the Italian Communist Party and terrorist events and between the percentage of votes cast for the socialists and terrorist events, no correlation was found between Christian Democratic votes and terrorism. One

interpretation of this finding is that, as more people feel able to express discontent at the ballot box, fewer are inclined to express dissent outside the system. Confirming this is the strong negative correlation between percentage of blank ballots and terrorism and the strong positive correlation between degree of abstention from voting and terrorism.

As the author's data indicate, after the peak of the late 1970s, terrorist activity declined significantly. Nevertheless, the author is convinced, and we agree, that terrorism will persist as a characteristic of the Italian social system for the foreseeable future.

Domestic and International Terrorist Events in Italy ^a

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 ^b
Deaths	21	11	6	10	11	33	21	17	23	38	36	135	24	18
Wounded	628	432	507	394	221	613	312	173	247	407	262	334	30	25
Property destruction	208	225	310	293	254	325	239	322	1,338	1,862	1,766	567	370	167
Total number of events	439	554	832	776	656	816	467	685	1,805	2,723	2,139	833	908	346
"Right"	312	490	734	628	580	647	258	269	429	732	553	279	285	115
"Left"	12	13	26	88	72	162	209	326	993	1,590	1,182	308	586	193
Undetermined	115	51	72	60	4	7	0	90	383	401	404	246	37	38

^a These data have not been independently verified by the CIA.

^b Through September.

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Colombia: The Amnesty Issue

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The unenthusiastic response by guerrillas to Colombia's month-old amnesty law casts doubt on President Betancur's chief hope for ending the country's insurgency. Although some guerrilla leaders appear ready to accept the amnesty, most so far show little inclination to lay down their arms and participate in the legal political process. We agree with the US Embassy that the current uneasy truce probably will soon be shattered by a military-guerrilla clash or by a terrorist or insurgent action.

Betancur fulfilled a campaign promise when he signed the amnesty bill into law on 19 November and offered to reintegrate the former subversives and terrorists into society. He also announced an ambitious rural economic development plan to eliminate the root causes of insurgency in areas of guerrilla activity.

Since the amnesty went into effect, 340 guerrillas have been released from jail and terrorist-related incidents have fallen to their lowest level in 18 months. Nevertheless, only some 100 insurgents have come forward to accept the pardon, and several of the smaller guerrilla organizations have publicly rejected it.

The success or failure of the amnesty, however, will depend primarily on the responses of the two major groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19). The FARC has virtually rejected the program by demanding demilitarization of all disputed areas—a condition totally unacceptable to the Colombian military. The intentions of the M-19, on the other hand, remain unclear. the group's hierarchy is either undecided or divided. We believe that at least some leaders, especially those recently released from prison under a provision of the amnesty law, may decide to reenter the legal political arena.

The initial rejection of the amnesty by Jaime Bateman, the M-19's commander in chief, may be part of a larger overall strategy. The Colombian military reportedly believes that Bateman wants to keep M-19 military elements intact in the field while he organizes a legitimate political party. He thus would have a fallback position—and uncompromised cadre—should the legalized party fail to garner sufficient popular support.

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The potential for renewed violence remains high. The Colombian military has criticized the amnesty, arguing that the insurgents will use it only to rest and regroup before launching a new offensive. Although the armed forces generally have cooperated—albeit reluctantly—with the amnesty program, counterinsurgency operations continue. Even if no major military-guerrilla clashes result, we believe that the guerrillas probably will carry out a terrorist act soon to demonstrate their continued strength.

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Betancur has attained many of his political objectives, however, even if the amnesty law does not achieve its primary goal. The general populace has applauded his efforts and would place the blame for renewed violence on the insurgents. The President, therefore, probably would have strong public support if he later were to discard the olive branch in favor of a military solution.

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Special Analysis

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**South Yemen:
Evolving Role in International
Terrorism in 1982** [redacted]

South Yemen (The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen or PDRY) has supported international terrorism since the late 1960s, providing weapons, training, and sanctuary to a broad spectrum of leftist terrorist groups and encouraging terrorist acts against neighboring Arab governments. In the past, South Yemen's Marxist-oriented regime has viewed international terrorism as a legitimate means to attain political objectives, though Aden's recent efforts to improve relations with moderate Arab and West European states suggests that the PDRY may be selectively reevaluating this policy. [redacted]

Support Activities

Politically ostracized because of its Marxist orientation, Aden in the past had turned to radical states and terrorist groups in the Arab world for allies. [redacted]

[redacted] Aden viewed aid to dissidents employing terrorist tactics in neighboring countries as an important tool for weakening hostile regimes. Permitting and encouraging the establishment of terrorist offices and training camps in the PDRY also enhanced the revolutionary credentials of the South Yemeni regime. In spite of this close association with terrorist groups, however, we have no evidence that Yemeni intelligence officials have been involved directly in carrying out terrorist operations. [redacted]

[redacted] at least some paramilitary training facilities continue to provide instruction in automatic weapons, demolitions, small unit tactics and, to some extent, political

indoctrination for Middle Eastern groups. [redacted]

Radical groups that aim to overthrow neighboring regimes continued to be the main recipients of South Yemeni assistance through most of 1982. Politically and militarily, Aden has aligned itself with rejectionists in the Palestinian movement who oppose negotiations with Tel Aviv and view terrorism as a legitimate weapon against Israel. Aden has supplied arms and munitions to a number of these groups in the past, a probably continued to do so in 1982, although little recent information is available on the status of this supply relationship. [redacted]

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PDRY became the sanctuary for a substantial number of Palestinian evacuees from Beirut. [redacted] unlike the conservative Arab regimes, Aden was not reluctant to accept fighters from the

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radical factions. Some leftist extremists who had been evacuated to more conservative Arab countries eventually moved to the PDRY. [REDACTED]

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Arab states. [REDACTED] Aden is seeking to broaden contacts with a number of moderate Arab and West European countries to obtain badly needed economic assistance. A major part of this campaign appears to involve a change in Aden's public image as a supporter of international terrorism and subversion. [REDACTED]

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Fragmentary evidence of PDRY support for other terrorist groups was also noted over the last year. Aden largely directs the activities of the National Democratic Front (NDF), ostensibly an alliance of North Yemen dissidents seeking the overthrow of the government in Sanaa. In its fight against the government in Sanaa, the NDF has carried out both large-scale insurgent attacks against North Yemeni troops and terrorist operations, including assassinations, in the southern areas of North Yemen. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Aden has already taken steps to improve relations with two nearby Arab neighbors. Throughout the summer, Kuwait—with the backing of the Gulf Cooperation Council—mediated negotiations to settle differences between South Yemen and Oman. In late October, the two countries signed a reconciliation agreement, pledging to curb propaganda broadcasts and to ensure noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Such an agreement, and the PDRY's need to show evidence of good faith, will most likely lead to a reduction—if not elimination—of Aden's support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, a longstanding Omani dissident group. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Aden may be reducing support for NDF activities against North Yemen. A PDRY decision to direct a reduction in NDF activities presumably reflects insurgent inability to score a decisive victory against strengthened North Yemeni forces as well as Aden's perception that more can be gained from pursuing a moderate course. [REDACTED]

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Aden has provided assistance to groups planning operations against other Middle East regimes. [REDACTED]

The use of South Yemen as transit point for weapons and personnel to other areas of the Middle East— [REDACTED]

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A Change of Course?

Evidence surfaced in late summer indicates that Aden may be reevaluating its involvement in terrorist activity, particularly that directed against neighboring

Aden's efforts may be little more than tactical moves to induce economic assistance while waiting for the development of more favorable conditions for supporting insurgent activities. The Saudis, in particular, are cautious. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] although support to groups opposed to other Arab regimes may be declining, Aden continues to provide sanctuary and assistance to groups willing to undertake terrorist operations against Israel. [REDACTED]

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
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We also believe that South Yemeni leader al-Hasani's present course may be tied to power plays between factions within the PDRY government. [redacted]



[redacted] al-Hasani may be regarded as a pragmatist willing to undertake limited policy shifts for short-term gain. Such a course would allow al-Hasani to expand his own influence over the PDRY government, the NDF, and the PFLO while retaining the option of reactivating the insurgent groups at a future date. [redacted]

Conclusion

At least for the next year, Oman and North Yemen will probably face less of a threat from South Yemeni supported insurgent groups. Despite the PDRY's current pragmatic approaches to the West, however, we believe that internal political dynamics within the PDRY leadership will prevent a fundamental realignment away from radical internal and international policies. Over the longer term PDRY neighbors will continue to face the possibility of resurgent Aden-backed dissident activities, particularly if Arab and Western aid to South Yemen falls short of expectations. PDRY support for Palestinian groups opposed to Israel, in any case, will continue and may assume an even greater importance because of the loss of PLO bases and materiel following the invasion of Lebanon. [redacted]

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
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International Terrorist Incidents, 1982^a

— Total, 726
 — Of which: US targets, 377

**Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982, by Month**

	Total												Total
Total	77	34	76	72	55	95	73	90	49	56	38	10	726
Kidnaping	5	2	2	3	1		3			3	2		21
Barricade, hostage				1	1		1	1	7	1	5		17
Bombing	39	16	36	32	20	47	42	31	13	16	17	2	311
Armed attack			2	1	1				2	1			7
Hijacking	2	4	1	4	2	1	3	4	1	3	3	1	29
Assassination	4	3	5	9	1	8	3	4	5				42
Threats, hoax	21	5	25	16	26	32	19	45	16	22	7	5	239
Sniping	2	3	2	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	1		22
Other ^b	4	1	3	3	1	6	1	3	3	8	3	2	38

^a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

^b Break-ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc.

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Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance and wider implications. []

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16 December

Portugal

In Ponta Delgada, the Municipal Finance Department was the target of an attempted bombing. The unexploded bomb was similar to other small explosive devices found by police recently. No group has claimed responsibility for any of the explosive attacks. []

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20-27 December

Italy

In Milan, six Red Brigades (BR) members belonging to the "Walter Alasia" column were arrested based on leads provided by the large number of BR documents seized in Cinisello Balsamo raids in November. Two important BR members involved in murders in 1980-81 were among those apprehended. Italian authorities believe the Alasia Column is still capable of conducting terrorist attacks. []

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21 December

United States

In New York City, the previously unknown United Jewish Underground claimed credit for the attempted bombing of an Italian UN mission car within a block of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. The attack was in protest for the jailing of Soviet dissident Anatoly Scharansky. []

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Honduras

Unknown persons threw a bomb from an automobile at the headquarters of the San Pedro Sula newspaper *La Prensa* causing severe damage but no injuries. In the following day's issue, the incident was given front page coverage, and editors pledged to continue to denounce terrorism. *La Prensa* is owned by Jorge Larach who supports the Suazo regime and whose family and business holdings have been the targets of repeated terrorist attacks. []

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22 December

Spain

In Bilbao, three US firms were targets of terrorist bombs claimed by a previously unknown group, "Iraultza." . . . Despite Iraultza's claim, we believe Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) splinters are responsible for the attacks, which occurred less than a week after Spanish banks agreed to stop paying ETA "revolutionary taxes." []

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23 December

**Australia**

In Sydney, bombings were conducted against the Israeli Consulate and a Jewish soccer club. A caller claimed the attack for the "Organization for the Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners"; another caller claimed the PLO was responsible, but the PLO has denied responsibility. 


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25 December


Peru

Five men armed with machineguns and pistols assassinated the Mayor of the Ayacucho District of Machenten in front of his family and several onlookers. A note left on the body said, "this is how police informants die." The attack occurred only two days after the Ayacucho regional director of the National Culture Institute was shot to death and was the fourth attack on a government official in Ayacucho in December. All of the incidents have been attributed to the Shining Path. 

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27 December


West Germany

In Stuttgart, a Yugoslav tourist office and a grocery store owned by Yugoslavs were bombed. No group has claimed credit; we believe Croatian terrorists may have been responsible. 

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28 December

Italy

In Ostia, a previously unknown group called Communists for the Struggle of the Proletariat claimed responsibility for the arson attack on a US NATO forces' van and demanded Italy's withdrawal from NATO. 

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29 December

Spain

At the Spanish-French border, two Spanish civil guards were shot to death by two Basque Fatherland and Liberty/Military (ETA/M) assailants. The assassinations follow Minister of Interior's statement on 22 December that the Spanish Government would reconsider its criteria for dealing with terrorists, if the terrorists would observe a six-month truce. [] 25X1

29 December

Peru

President Belaunde transferred security responsibilities from the police to the military in five provinces in Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica Departments after leftist guerrillas rejected a government demand to surrender. The decision followed by less than 24 hours the seizure of a major Ayacucho radio station by Shining Path, which broadcast a message calling for Peruvians to "unite in the armed struggle." [] 25X1

Corsica

In Ajaccio, the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) bombed seven French-owned buildings. The nationalist FLNC injured three policemen in 27 December bombings and announced the FLNC would begin collecting "revolutionary taxes" from wealthy Corsicans and Frenchmen to support their independence movement. [] 25X1

30 December

Spain

In San Sebastian, a kidnaped Basque industrialist was found alive after ransom negotiations broke down. There are conflicting claims of responsibility for the kidnaping, although police and Basque sources suspect Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) guerrillas. [] 25X1

1 January 1983

Peru

Terrorists dynamited several electric transmission towers in Lurin, 25 miles south of Lima, and a second group occupied a radio station in Arequipa, 650 miles south of the capital, where they broadcast a call for popular insurrection. Both incidents occurred outside the area placed under military control by President Belaunde. The government blamed the Shining Path for both incidents. [] 25X1

2 January 1983

Peru

A group of terrorists stormed the home of the Vice Mayor of Ayacucho, held a "peoples' trial," and then executed him in front of his wife and four children. The incident was almost identical to other recent attacks attributed to the Shining Path. [] 25X1

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